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Grand Theory or Discrete Proposal?
Religious Accommodations and Health
Related Harms
James M. Oleske, Jr.*
Abstract
More than a quarter-century has passed since the Supreme
Court decided in Employment Division v. Smith that religious
accommodations are primarily a matter of legislative grace, not
constitutional right. In that time, barrels of ink have been spilled
over the merits of the Smith decision. But comparatively little
attention has been given to the issue of how legislatures and other
political actors should exercise their discretion to grant or deny
specific religious accommodations. In their article To
Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State
Regulate Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third
Parties?, Professor Hillel Levin, Dr. Allan Jacobs, and Dr. Kavita
Arora aim to fill that critical gap. They propose a specific
methodology for political actors to use in considering requests for
religious exemptions—with the goal of bringing more consistency
to the accommodation project—and their proposal has much to
recommend it. This Response argues, however, that the Authors’
argument for their proposal suffers by trying to do too much.
Instead of offering their proposal solely as a prudential tool for
policymakers, they also frame it as a constitutional tool that
judges can use to enforce the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. As detailed in this Response, the Authors’ effort to
have their proposal serve this second function runs into serious
problems that can only distract from their primary mission.
Accordingly, this Response suggests that the Authors refocus
*
Associate Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I am very
grateful to the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their
invitation to participate in this discussion and to Hillel Levin for his thoughtful
comments on an earlier draft of this Response.
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exclusively on that primary mission in future efforts to advance
their proposal and offers a few suggestions for how the Authors
might seek to operationalize their test in the political realm.
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I. Introduction
The law governing religious accommodations in the United
States is currently “a confusing and rather ragtag body of law.”1
After nearly three decades of reading the Free Exercise Clause to
provide a floor of required accommodation,2 the Supreme Court
reversed course in 1990, holding in Employment Division v.
Smith3 that the Constitution does not provide a right to religious
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws.4
Congress then passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA)5 in an effort to reinstitute the pre-Smith landscape,6
1. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 839, 845 (2014).
2. See Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 144
(1987) (requiring accommodation from unemployment compensation rule and
explaining that the government “sometimes must . . . accommodate religious
practices”); see generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (requiring
accommodation from compulsory education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (requiring accommodation from rule requiring unemployment
compensation beneficiaries to be available to work on Saturday).
3. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
4. Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb-4 (2012).
6. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513–16 (discussing the
historical backdrop of RFRA).
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but the Court held in 1997 that RFRA is invalid as applied to the
states.7 RFRA still provides a presumptive right to religious
exemptions from federal law, but the precise strength of that
presumption is unclear.8 Meanwhile, twenty-one states have
enacted their own RFRAs,9 most of which have not been enforced
as vigorously as their proponents might have hoped;10 twelve
states without RFRAs have constitutional provisions that courts
have interpreted to provide more protection than Smith;11 four
states without RFRAs have interpreted their constitutions to
embody the Smith rule;12 and the law is unclear in the rest of the
states. On top of all that, the seemingly bright-line constitutional
rule in Smith is not actually so bright. Lower courts have taken
vastly different approaches in determining whether a law is too
underinclusive to qualify as “generally applicable” for purposes of
Smith,13 and the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue in a
case not involving obvious gerrymandering.14
But wait, there’s more!
7. See id. at 511, 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”).
8. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 n.3
(2014) (“On [one] understanding of our pre-Smith cases, RFRA did more than
merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases; it provided
even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those
decisions.”). But see id. at 2767 n.18 (finding it unnecessary to resolve this issue
definitively).
9. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NCSL (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
(last visited Aug. 8, 2016) (providing a list of state equivalents to RFRA) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at
State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466, 485 (2010) (surveying cases and concluding
that “[c]ourts often interpret state RFRAs in an incredibly watered down
manner”).
11. See Laycock, supra, note 1, at 844 n.22 (citing cases).
12. See id. at 844 n.23 (citing cases).
13. See James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty
for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 306–14
(2013) (discussing the lower court decisions).
14. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 535 (1993) (finding that a city had enacted ordinances constituting a
religious gerrymander targeting the ritual animal sacrifices of a Santeria
church).

390

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 387 (2016)

In addition to creating general exemption rights with RFRAs,
legislatures have enacted thousands of issue-specific religious
accommodations.15 And whether an accommodation is made
pursuant to a RFRA or a specific statutory forbearance, an
Establishment Clause objection could be raised to the
accommodation. Although the Court has held that religious
exemptions “need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular
entities’” in all cases,16 it has struck down exemptions that do not
appropriately balance their benefits with the costs they impose on
third parties.17 Where exactly that balance should be struck is the
subject of intense disagreement.18
Into this breach step Professor Hillel Levin, Dr. Allan Jacobs,
and Dr. Kavita Arora (the Authors) with their ambitious and
illuminating new article, To Accommodate or Not to
Accommodate: (When) Should the State Regulate Religion to
Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties.19 In it, the
Authors focus on a specific challenge—situations in which a
religious exemption may “impose risks, burdens, or costs on
children”20—to develop a test aimed at bringing more principle
and greater consistency to the accommodation project.21 From the
outset, the authors note that “although the test was developed
15. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992)
(reporting over 2,000 such accommodations).
16. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).
17. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985)
(striking down a statute that “command[ed] that Sabbath religious concerns
automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace,” and noting
that “the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the
employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath”); see also
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 710 (“An accommodation must be measured so that it does
not override other significant interests.”).
18. Compare Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and
Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39 (2014) (reading the
establishment bar narrowly), with Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 343
(2014) (reading the establishment bar broadly). See Levin, Jacobs & Arora, infra
note 19, at 969 & n.262 (noting the uncertainty about when an accommodation
violates the Establishment Clause).
19. 72 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 915 (2016).
20. Id. at 917.
21. Id. at 920, 966, 968.
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specifically to address religious practices that may impose health
related harms to children and third-parties, it also has potential
implications in other contexts as well.”22 The Article ends by
addressing the import and challenges of “accommodationism”
writ large, with the full sweep of the Authors’ proposal on
display:
Our test is a step forward in that it offers a consistent and
principled approach to [accommodation] questions that does
not simply leave them to the interest group dynamics of the
political marketplace. Instead, the test balances the needs of
the state and those of religious people by simultaneously
acknowledging the state’s need to protect itself and its citizens
from religious practices that impose costs on others, while also
respecting the values of pluralism. It also incorporates and
respects constitutional church-state doctrines and suggests a
way to resolve abiding tensions between the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses. Finally, the test can serve as a valuable
tool for different kinds of decision makers—legislators,
administrative officials, judges, and clinicians—and is
sensitive to the relative institutional strengths and weaknesses
of each.23

As the italicized sentences at the end of that passage make
clear, this is no small proposal. It offers reconciliation of the
Religion Clauses, a topic which itself has spawned several grand
theories,24 as well as the promise of a test that can transcend
branches of government and even inform private-sector decisions.
That said, the Authors’ central focus in developing and applying
their test is on “legislators and other policymakers.”25
Accommodation decisions made by the political branches, the
Authors explain, are “often unmoored from consideration of
underlying values”26 and driven by the dynamics of interest-group
22. Id. at 916.
23. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
24. See generally Eric J. Segall, Doctrinal Legal Scholarship and Religious
Liberty: A Review of Jesse Choper’s Securing Religious Liberty, 5 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 71, 77 (1996) (referring to the various “prominent grand theories
purporting to explain the Religion Clauses” that Professor Choper identified in
his book before offering his own theory).
25. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 968.
26. Id. at 952; see id. at 950–51
[M]any of our laws seem to lack any principled balancing at all. That
is, there seem to be no principles at play in the degree to which we
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politics.27 Finding this state of affairs “deeply troubling,”28 the
Authors offer a test that is aimed at channeling policymakers’
accommodation decisions into a principled balancing of competing
interests.29
The challenge facing the Authors would be daunting enough
if they kept their focus exclusively on the policymaking process
and offered a reform proposal designed to “impose consistency on
the accommodation and non-accommodation of religious practices
that may harm children and third parties.”30 Their task only
becomes more overwhelming, however, by including a
simultaneous effort to provide judges with a “tool for making
constitutional determinations as to whether the legal treatment
of a religious practice violates the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause.”31 The Authors attempt to pursue both of
these ambitious goals with a unified test, and the natural
question that this decision prompts is whether they are trying to
do too much. The answer, I fear, is “yes.” As discussed in Part II
of this Response, the current constitutional landscape—which the
Authors accept in making their proposal—causes considerable
problems for their proposal as a constitutional tool. Those
problems, however, do not cast doubt on the suitability of the
Authors’ test for the task of improving non-judicial
accommodations, which is clearly their core goal. Accordingly,
Part III of this Response offers some suggestions for how the
Authors might advance that goal by pursuing a strategy of more
discrete reforms.

permit or limit religious freedom in individual cases. Sometimes we
allow religious groups to impose significant costs and harms on third
parties . . . . On the other hand, sometimes statutes or regulations
prohibit the exercise of religious freedom even where there is little or
no harm to anyone.
27. See id. at 961 (“In short, religious groups operate in the political
marketplace like other interest groups. As such, whether they win or lose on a
particular political issue is related less to a principled balancing of the
competing underlying values than it is to the political dynamics in play.”).
28. Id. at 961.
29. See id. at 966–71 (reciting and explaining the test).
30. Id. at 968.
31. Id. at 970.
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II. The Dangers of Going Big
In the pages leading up to the announcement of their
proposed test, the Authors reassure readers that “our project is
not to re-litigate the merits of Smith.”32 That decision, they
conclude, “is unlikely to be reversed in the near to intermediate
term, and a serious discussion of religious accommodations must
accept a legal regime in which Smith is good law.”33 Yet, in the
very next paragraph, the Authors justify their proposal with
reference to a constitutional understanding that runs directly
contrary to Smith. Specifically, in discussing how their proposal
will vindicate free exercise values, they write: “to the degree that
different religious groups may receive different treatment from
legislatures as a result of the political power of the groups,
constitutional questions arise.”34 Smith, however, taught that
while it “may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in,” that was an
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government” that did not
offend the Constitution.35 In light of that teaching, when the
Authors proceed to discuss how “competing constitutional values
demand careful and principled balancing,”36 and how their test
“balances the competing interests . . . according to the yin and
yang of the First Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses,”37 they are including a “yin” that does not appear to exist
under Smith.
32. Id. at 964.
33. Id. I am not as convinced as the Authors that the near-to-intermediateterm prospects for overturning Smith are quite so bleak. See James M. Oleske,
Jr., A Regrettable Invitation to “Constitutional Resistance,” Renewed Confusion
over Religious Exemptions, and the Future of Free Exercise, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 38–39 & n.197), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2837392 (discussing recent indications that some
justices may be newly open to reconsidering Smith).
34. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 964–65. Notably, the case the
Authors cite for this proposition concerns RFRA, not the Free Exercise Clause.
See id. at 965 n.245 (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2006)).
35. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990).
36. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 965.
37. Id. at 966.
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A passage from earlier in the Article nicely illustrates how
much broader than Smith the Authors assume the protections of
the Free Exercise Clause might extend:
“[L]awmakers
sometimes
reject
requested
religious
accommodations and restrict religious practices for a variety of
other reasons: animus, mistrust, indifference, lack of
awareness, political self-interest, and so forth. . . . Lawmakers
violate the Constitution when they attempt to impose
restrictions on religious practices for some or all of these
reasons.”38

While the Smith Court’s view of the Free Exercise Clause
would protect against denials of accommodation for the first
reason (animus) and possibly the second (mistrust, assuming it is
of religion and not of exemptions generally), the Smith view is not
generally implicated by failures to accommodate due to
indifference, lack of awareness, or political self-interest. Indeed,
those reasons are precisely why minority religions are presumed
to do worse in the political process, which was a result the Smith
Court explicitly acknowledged and accepted.39
In sum, insofar as the Authors maintain that their test
“protects Free Exercise interests” by “prevent[ing] restriction of

38. Id. at 945–46.
39. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (quoting Smith). It bears
noting that one of the Authors has previously challenged the presumption
mentioned in the text and argued that accommodation might be better handled
in the political process than in the courts. See Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking
Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1617, 1681 (2015)
[R]eligious groups have more potency in the majoritarian branches
than is often understood as a result of their ability to work together
and with others within the political system. . . . [C]ourts’ institutional
structure gives them no special expertise on religious liberty
questions. . . . In combination, these dynamics undermine arguments
in favor of special judicial consideration for religious minority groups
in the normal course of affairs.
But see Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 172–73 (2016)
If we rely exclusively on legislatures to address these issues and
resolve them in advance through particularized religious exemptions
passed in the normal legislative process, we will find ourselves sorely
frustrated. The situation will end up resembling the South Pacific—
an archipelago of religious exemptions in a wide ocean of religious
need.
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religious practices on frivolous grounds,”40 their test embodies a
view of the Free Exercise Clause that departs from Smith. I
happen to agree with the Authors’ view, which is why I argue
elsewhere that the Court should reconsider Smith,41 but our
shared view cannot be said to represent current law.
The second complication the Authors encounter by tying
their test to the Constitution and treating it as a tool for the
judiciary as well as policymakers concerns the “Magnitude” prong
of their test. Before turning to that prong, however, this would be
a good time to review all three main provisions of the Authors’
test. The first prong, the “Bases for Possible Restriction” prong,
establishes what the Authors describe as “a default rule that
religious practices should be respected unless they unduly
interfere with the real and measurable interests of children
within the religion and others outside the religious group.”42 The
second prong, the “Likelihood of Effect,” provides that
government should only deny an accommodation to a religious
practice if its adverse impact on others is “actual” and “likely,”
rather than “merely hypothetical.”43 That brings us to the
“Magnitude of Effect,” the final component of the Authors’ test,
and the one of immediate concern here. It provides:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if society tolerates
harms from comparable mainstream practices that impose
harms of a similar magnitude to the harms posed by the
religious practice at issue, then it should not restrict that
religious practice. Conversely, if a mainstream practice that
imposes severe harms is forbidden, then a comparable
religious practice that imposes harms of a similar magnitude
should likewise not be tolerated. Legislatures should be
mindful of this provision when considering religious
accommodations, and courts should be active in enforcing it. 44

40. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 970.
41. See Oleske, supra note 33, at 39–56 (arguing that the Court should
apply modestly heightened scrutiny when a generally applicable law
incidentally burdens religion and should require the government to show that it
has more than a de minimis interest in denying a religious accommodation).
42. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 968.
43. Id. at 967.
44. Id.
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The Authors’ lead explanation of the Magnitude prong is that
it “captures the Supreme Court’s admonition in [Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah45] that society may not
target religious practices for censure when it permits comparable
mainstream
practices,
thus
enforcing
Free
Exercise
46
boundaries.” The problem is that neither the language of the
Authors’ Magnitude prong, nor its application elsewhere in the
Article, is limited to laws that “target religious practices for
censure.” Indeed, some passages in the Article could be read as
supporting the far-reaching argument that a religious exemption
must be made any time a law includes even a single comparable
secular exemption, even if the law still applies to a multitude of
other secular practices that are comparable to the religious
practice.47 Given that most laws include some exemptions,
interpreting Lukumi this broadly would threaten to swallow
Smith, which is one of many reasons the broad interpretation has
been the subject of intense skepticism in free exercise
scholarship.48 The Authors do not engage that scholarship, but
45. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
46. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 969. See id. at 970 (“The
Magnitude prong, as noted, tracks Lukumi, in precluding pretextual laws that
functionally, but not explicitly, single out religious practices for restriction.”
(emphasis added)).
47. See id. at 1011 n.497 (describing the Magnitude prong as “proposing
that a religious practice not be restricted if a comparative and commonly
practiced secular activity exists”); id. at 1012 n. 504 (explaining that “where a
religious practice has a comparable mainstream practice [that is permitted],
policymakers should not restrict the religious practice”); see also id. at 989–90
(“If society tolerates the risk for the comparable mainstream practice . . . it must
treat the religious practice comparably.”); id. at 1002 n.449 (explaining that
“religious practices may be regulated when their direct or indirect effects are
severe as long as there is no comparable secular practice accepted by society”)
(emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False
Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119,
194–203 (2002) (arguing that there are “too many conceptual and practical
problems with the [secular-exemption-requires-religious-exemption view] for it
to be accepted”); Oleske, supra note 13, at 298–301, 326-31 (arguing that “a
broad selective-exemption rule that goes beyond situations suggesting
discriminatory intent cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's current
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause”); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1539–42 (1999)
(providing several reasons for rejecting the secular-exemption-requiresreligious-exemption interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause); Colin A.
Devine, Comment, A Critique of the Secular Exceptions Approach to Religious
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doing so might give them pause about the “lodestar” role they
assert the Magnitude prong can play in judicial administration of
their test.49
The final difficulty with treating the Authors’ test as a
constitutional tool concerns the issue of consistency. At times, the
Authors indicate that while they do intend their test to provide
more consistency in reasoning by policymakers, it will not require
consistency of results. As the Authors write at one point late in
their article:
With respect to our test, reasonable people may reasonably
disagree about the magnitude of the risks associated with a
particular religious practice. Some policymakers will consider
certain costs tolerable, while others will find the same costs
intolerable. Consequently, they may disagree as to how to
treat the religious practice under the first prong of the test. . . .
[T]erms in the first prong like “unreasonable burdens,”
“sufficiently deleterious effects,” “substantial chance,” and
Exemptions, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1348 (2015) (same). But see Douglas Laycock &
Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law & The Free Exercise of Religion, 95
NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2784336
(advocating for the secular-exemption-requires-religious-exemption view). The
premise of Professor Laycock and Mr. Collis’s argument—that Smith and
Lukumi are best read to mean that the Free Exercise Clause protects against
more than the danger of intentional discrimination—is difficult to square with
the Court’s own post-Lukumi description of its free exercise jurisprudence. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (describing “the free exercise
of religion as defined by Smith” as freedom from “laws which are enacted with
the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practice”); id. at 531
(identifying the baseline for what constitutes a free exercise violation as
“legislation enacted due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious
practice”); id. at 534 (explaining that RFRA did not match the Free Exercise
Clause because it would affect laws “without regard to whether they had the
object of stifling or punishing free exercise”).
49. Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 968. Professor Levin did
address the breadth of Lukumi in an earlier article, observing that “[i]t can be
difficult to determine whether a decision not to accommodate religious practices
and beliefs should be classified as a Smith-type case . . . or a Lukumi-type case.”
Levin, supra note 39, at 1672. Given that the Levin, Jacobs & Arora article
never explicitly addresses the issue of how broadly Lukumi should be
interpreted, one could read the Authors as trying to remain agnostic on this
hotly disputed question. Abstaining from that question would not necessarily be
a problem if the Authors were proposing their test solely as a prudential tool for
policymakers. But such abstention does seem problematic when the Authors are
also framing their test as a “tool for making constitutional determinations,” with
a Magnitude prong that they assert “tracks Lukumi” and that “courts should be
active in enforcing.” Levin, Jacobs & Arora, supra note 19, at 967, 970.
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“objectively severe” require the application of judgment, and
people’s judgment may differ in different cases. But this lack
of certitude is not something that should concern us any more
than it does in the case of any other legal test. 50

The final sentence in this passage is in considerable tension
with the rationale the Authors provide earlier for offering their
test in the first place. In that earlier discussion, the Authors
highlight the current inconsistency surrounding religious
accommodations, and they set up and then knock down the very
“should not concern us” rationale they rely upon in the passage
above. Here is the key passage from the earlier discussion:
We can ask why, given that the vast majority of our laws are
produced through the very same political dynamic as we have
identified in this context, and therefore display similar
inconsistencies and pathologies throughout the law, we should
be especially wary of this dynamic in the context of religious
accommodationism.51

The answer the Authors give to this question is that both
under- and over-accommodation in the political process
implicates “constitutional values” that “demand careful and
principled balancing and consistent resolution on the part of
policymakers and judges confronting these cases.”52 Demanding
consistent resolution makes sense if the Authors are dealing with
a constitutional issue and not just a prudential one. But by the
end of the Article, the Authors appear to be taking a very
different tack when they argue that readers should not be
concerned about different decisionmakers reaching different
conclusions as to whether a particular religious practice should
be accommodated.
In the end, the Authors’ decision to frame their proposal as a
constitutional tool leads to more questions than answers. That
need not be fatal, however, for the underlying test, which could
well serve as a helpful tool for better policymaking in the
accommodation area.

50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1010.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 965 (emphasis added).
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III. Suggestions for Starting Small
As noted above, even if the Authors narrowed the scope of
their project to the goal of making legislative and administrative
accommodation decisions more principled and consistent, it would
still be a very tall order. The biggest outstanding question is how
to operationalize the Authors’ test in the political realm, where,
unlike the judicial realm, decisions are rarely bound by subjectspecific tests and precedents. As the Authors consider how to
overcome this challenge, and convince policymakers to subject
themselves to the test, I would offer a few suggestions for discrete
starting points.
The first mechanism that comes to mind is executive orders,
whether presidential or gubernatorial, which could be used to
advance the test in the regulatory realm. A second mechanism
that might be worth considering is whether the elements of the
test—or, more accurately, legislative evidence relevant to those
elements—could be incorporated into official bill summaries done
by nonpartisan legislative staff. If information about the asserted
costs and benefits of accommodations were systematically
presented to legislators along with fiscal summaries and revenue
impact statements, perhaps they would become accustomed to
utilizing the test in their decisions (though it still would not be
binding in any real sense). The third mechanism that comes to
mind is drafting model legislation specifically designed to guide
accommodation decisions by the political branches. My final
thought on how best to operationalize the Authors’ test is to ask:
Has anything like this ever been done before? If precedent exists
for reforming legislative decisionmaking on a specific issue to
address perceived systematic shortcomings, that precedent would
be well worth studying.
IV. Conclusion
Using the issue of health-related harm as a catalyst, the
Authors have initiated a critical conversation about how
policymakers should discern the appropriate limits of religious
accommodation. The Authors come to the conversation armed
with a concrete proposal aimed at delivering more principled and
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consistent decisions on accommodations, and the proposal has
much to recommend it. This Response has suggested, however,
that the proposal suffers by trying to do too much. By going
beyond the issue of improving accommodation decisions in the
political realm, and trying to have their proposal do double duty
as a constitutional tool, the Authors invite thorny questions that
can only distract from their primary mission. Accordingly, this
Response suggests that the most promising path forward for the
proposal would be to divorce it from larger efforts to achieve free
exercise/establishment reconciliation and focus on finding
discrete ways to advance it as a good government measure.

